The challenge to government of Evo Morales mounted in mid-September by the rightist rulers of five of the nine Bolivian provinces appears so far to have achieved its essential objective.

The rightist assault assumed features of an armed rebellion, including an ambush of peasant protesters in the province of Pando and the deliberate murder of dozens of them, as well as blockages of oil and gas pipelines. But the rightists did not have the means to overthrow Morales, since their base is confined to the eastern half of the country, nor did they dare to upset the stability of the region by launching a civil war or trying to impose a formal division of the country.

The governments of the region, united in Unasur, the South American Union, supported the legal government, which won the support of two thirds of the population of the country in an Aug. 10 referendum. By now they know that Morales is a good bet for keeping the radicalization in Bolivia under control, and they do not want to face a civil war in their backyards.

It is clear that backing of the bourgeois governments of Bolivia's neighbors for constitutional legality in the volatile Andean country was predicated on a willingness of Morales to compromise with his rightist opponents.

A compromise with the radical right that controls five out of the nine provinces (they are called "departments" in Bolivia), of course, could only be made at the expense of the workers and peasants who have been demanding reforms in their interest from the Morales government, which they elected for that purpose. That fact emerges from the accord adopted on Sept. 16 in the city of Cochabamba.

The text of the document, published Sept. 17 by Econoticias, a Bolivian left website, states: "The National Government expresses its respect for the right of autonomy of  the departments of  Pando, Beni, Tarija and Santa Cruz."

The agreement establishes a negotiating body to function for three months. It says that the "process of dialogue" will be "accompanied" by "witnesses and facilitators," which will include the Catholic Church, Unasur, the European Union, and the United Nations.

The Morales government agreed not only to postpone the vote on its proposed new constitution for a month ("a length of time that could be extended in accordance with the advances in national dialogue") but to "suspend the government's media campaign  in support of the proposed new constitution."

The right-wing opposition seemed to recoup through the agreement the one defeat it has suffered in the confrontation. The rightist governor of Pando had overplayed his hand, sponsoring a massacre of peasant marchers. Against the background of national outcry, Morales declared martial law in the province and arrested the governor.

The agreement called for a "clarification of the sad events in the department of Pando through national and impartial international bodies and a congressional committee that will proceed immediately to the site of the events. Should the bodies mentioned establish responsibilities [for the massacre], the right to a proper trial is guaranteed. The personal safety of the authorities, civil and social leaders in Pando is also guaranteed.'"

Moreover: "No judicial procedures of a political nature are to be undertaken against civic and social leaders, authorities in the departments [Pando, Beni, Tarija, Santa Cruz and Pando) that mobilized for the departmental and social demands that preceded this accord, and the media campaign to discredit social and civil actors and authorities is also to be stopped."

The document ended with the statement: "The prefect of the department of Tarija and those accompanying him, representing the five mobilized departments, demand the lifting of the state of siege in the department of Pando."

Even the leadership of the national trade-union confederation, the COB (Confederación Obrera de Bolivia), which has signed a pact with Morales and is generally subservient to the regime, protested against the accord.

In the name of the COB leadership, Mario Lopez declared, according to a Sept. 18 report in Econoticias: "We are not in favor of this dialogue." He continued: "They [the right] are certainly going to continue with their blackmail. ... The president should meet with the people, not the oligarchy."

The miners union, the most powerful union in the country, went further and denounced the COB leadership's pact with Morales. Econoticias quoted the union's executive secretary, Guido Mitma, as saying: "For us this [pact] is a political question and we workers cannot support it. In principle, we reject this action by compañero Pedro Montes [the main leader of the COB], who unconstitutionally signed this pact with the regime."

Econoticias summarized further remarks by Mitma: "The miners' leader warned that the policy of conciliation with the bourgeoisie would not benefit the people or the process of change. To the contrary, he called for deepening the agenda of October [the mass movement that forced out the previous president]—that is, real nationalization of the non-renewable resources, which remain in the hands of the transnationals, the expropriation of the immense latifundia in the East and the valleys [the rightist-controlled departments], the distribution of the land to the peasants and poor indigenous people, and an improvement in the working and living conditions of the workers."

Although Morales' party, the MAS (Movement toward Socialism), did open the way for some mobilizations against the right, essentially the president relied on the army to contain the excesses of the right. He had a certain success in Pando. But his use of the military opened up a split in its command that revealed the basically reactionary nature of the institution.

Clave, a magazine of the Argentine Trotskyist group, the PTS (Partido de Trabajadores para el Socialismo) reported in its Sept. 18 issue: "General Trijo, chief of the armed forces, in his statement warned the autonomists and set a limit for them. But he also separated himself sharply from Comandante Chavez, who had offered support to Evo Morales.

"With this taking of position, the army announced that it rejected being 'the military agent of change' and began to present itself as the institution that 'guarantees order and the unity of the state.' This was in order to act as arbiter in case of greater destabilization, a reactionary role that will inevitably be directed against the mass movement."

Clave noted that even without any real national leadership, the more advanced sections of the mass movement were aroused to fight back by the rightist assault, even in the rightist controlled East: "Facing the racist and fascist attacks, the best organized sections of the mass movement in the East resisted valiantly, as shown by the defense of Plan 3000—a Santa Cruz working-class suburb of 250,000 inhabitants in the very capital of the Santa Cruz department [the bulwark of the right]—or the confrontations over the peasant market in Tarija.

"Other sectors in the line of fire, like the organizations of peasant settlers in San Julian and Yapacani, mobilized to counter-blockade the Santa Cruz 'civic activists.' In Chapare blockades were started, cutting off the Santa Cruz road in Bulo and other points.

"The Cobija [Pando] massacre aroused indignation to the boiling point. On Saturday, Sept. 18, the Unionista [fascist] assault on the peasant blockade at Tiquipaya was defeated and the attackers had to withdraw, taking at least 17 wounded with them. In Cuatro Canadas, the peasant blockade showed its machetes and shotguns and other weapons to warn the fascists that if they came they would return to Santa Cruz 'in boxes.'

"In Plan 3000, they organized self-defense brigades of young people and other inhabitants to combat the incursions of the UJC (The Youth Union of Santa Cruz, rightist paramilitaries).

"On Sept. 15 and 16, mass marches were held in La Paz [the capital of the country], organized by the Regional Workers Confederation and Fejuve [the neighborhood committees of El Alto, the working-class satellite city of La Paz], as well as university students organizations, the COB, and other people's organizations. They chanted slogans against American imperialism, the oligarchies in the East, and their fascist groups."

It seems, therefore, that there is fighting spirit among the Bolivian masses, even in the rightist-dominated areas, that can be organized and directed to defeat the right. The mid-September rightist assault should be warning that if a revolutionary leadership does not emerge that can accomplish this, the Morales regime will slowly be worn down by the pressure of the right and the blandishments of the surrounding bourgeois governments that are claiming to defend "constitutional order in Bolivia."

If that happens, the right will eventually overthrow Morales—but by that time it would only be the final act in another tragedy for the long-suffering working people of Bolivia.